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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gerald K. Umphenour appeals from the judgment of conviction entered following 
a court trial on stipulated facts. On appeal, he asserts that he was deprived of his 
constitutional right to a jury trial, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, 
when the district court held a court trial in the absence of any waiver of that right by 
Mr. Umphenour. In the alternative and assuming that Mr. Umphenour's court trial on 
stipulated facts was actually a guilty plea, Mr. Umphenour asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw 
plea on its mistaken belief that it lacked the jurisdiction to grant the motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Gerald K. Umphenour was charged, by Information, with possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), resisting and obstructing an officer, and 
possession of an open container of alcohol. (R., pp.46-47.) Mr. Umphenour was found 
guilty of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) following a bench 
trial at which the parties stipulated to the following facts: "On or about June 6th; in the 
State of Idaho; Gerald K. Umphenour possessed any amount of methamphetamine; and 
four, the defendant either knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled 
substance." (Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.13.) The record in this case is devoid of any waiver 
by Mr. Umphenour of his right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. (See R. and Tr.) 
The relevant portion of the transcript of the court trial at which Mr. Umphenour 
was found guilty reads as follows: 
1 
THE COURT: Let's go on the record, please. For the record this is 
File No. CR2012-488. Mr. Umphenour is here in court with Mr. Kovis, his 
counsel; and Mr. Tyler is representing the State. 
Counsel indicated before we came in that you had discussed this 
case further, and that there was a proposal that the parties stipulate to 
certain facts, and that the Court make findings based upon those facts. Is 
that generally what counsel wanted to do? 
MR. KOVIS: Yes, Your Honor. I talked with Mr. Umphenour, and 
I've gone over your proposed jury Instruction No. 2, which had the 
elements of the possession of a controlled substance elements one, two, 
three, and four: On or about June 6th; in the State of Idaho; Gerald K. 
Umphenour possessed any amount of methamphetamine; and four, the 
defendant either knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a 
controlled substance. Mr. Umphenour would stipulate to all of that being 
true. 
THE COURT: 
MR. TYLER: 
Mr. Tyler, is the State also stipulating to those facts? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Umphenour, you've had enough time to discuss 
this with your attorney; is that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, we talked this morning. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, after talking to him this morning at this 
time are you stipulating or agreeing that those facts that were just recited 
by Mr. Kovis are, in fact, true? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay, and has anybody promised you anything, 
Mr. Umphenour, as far as what would happen if you stipulated to those 
facts? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
MR. KOVIS: I just want to be clear, I did tell Mr. Umphenour that 
the two misdemeanor cases would be dismissed. The sentencing would 
be down the road; that he would not be incarcerated today. It's an open 
sentencing. We can argue that if he's placed on probation he can apply 
for unsupervised probation so he can go to North Dakota, or if he's on 
supervised probation he can ask for an interstate compact, whatever you 
call it, so that he can go to North Dakota. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, and I forgot about the two 
misdemeanors. It's my understanding those two misdemeanors would 
dismissed, and that's your understanding, Mr. Umphenour? 
THE DEFENDANT: I thought that open - I thought the one open· container 
was already dismissed. 
THE COURT: Well, if it wasn't it's going to be, how is that? I don't 
know. I would have to go look through the file. But if it's not dismissed it's 
going to be dismissed. And then sentencing would not occur today, but 
obviously you would be free to - you wouldn't be incarcerated. You would 
be free to come back at the time of sentencing, and then sentencing would 
be - after I listen to you and listen to the attorneys I would have to decide 
what type of sentence would be appropriate in this case. And so it's my 
understanding that both counsel want me to make a finding with respect to 
guilt or innocence based upon the stipulation that's been entered into by 
both parties? 
MR. KOVIS: 
MR. TYLER: 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Based on that stipulation the Court does find that on 
or about the 6th day of June, 2012; in the State of Idaho; Gerald K. 
Umphenour possessed some amount or any amount of 
methamphetamine; and that Mr. Umphenour either knew it was 
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance. Based upon 
those stipulated facts and findings, the Court does find that 
Mr. Umphenour is guilty of the offense in count one, that is, possession of 
a controlled substance .... 
(Tr., p.4, L.9 - p.7, L.9 (emphasis added).) 
Following his sentencing, Mr. Umphenour filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., 
p.94.) 
While this appeal was pending, Mr. Umphenour filed a "Motion for Commutation 
of Sentence, Suspension of Execution of Judgment and Placement on Supervised 
Probation / Drug Court OR Manifest Injustice for Withdraw [sic] of Plea" (hereinafter 
Motion to Withdraw Plea).1 (Motion to Withdraw Plea (Augmentation).) The district 
1 Mr. Umphenour also filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for a 
hearing. (Augmentation.) 
3 
court an Order Denying Motions, in which it concluded, "This court does not have 
jurisdiction these motions." (Order Denying Motions (Augmentation).) 
4 
ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Umphenour deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial, under both 
the Idaho and United States Constitutions, when the district court held a court 
trial in the absence of any waiver of that right by Mr. Umphenour? 
2. Assuming that Mr. Umphenour's court trial on stipulated facts was actually a 
guilty plea, did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on it? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mr. Umphenour Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Under Both 
The Idaho And United States Constitutions, When The District Court Held A Court Trial 
In The Absence Of Any Waiver Of That Right By Mr. Umphenour 
A. I ntrod u ctio n 
Without first obtaining a waiver of Mr. Umphenour's constitutional right to a jury 
trial, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, the district court found him 
guilty of a felony based on stipulated facts. The district court never once inquired of 
Mr. Umphenour whether he wished to waive his right to a jury trial, nor did it explain the 
effect the stipulation of facts would have on his right to a trial (either court or jury). 
Mr. Umphenour asserts that his constitutional right to a jury trial was violated 
when his guilt was found by the district court, rather than a jury, in the absence of a 
personal waiver. The district court did not obtain a waiver of Mr. Umphenour's right to a 
jury trial, let alone a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one, before conducting a court 
trial on stipulated facts that consisted of all of the elements of the offense. While 
Mr. Umphenour did not object to the lack of a jury trial below, he asserts that the 
deprivation represents fundamental, structural error, and therefore, can be considered 
for the first time on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, this Court should vacate 
the judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Fundamental Error 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court announced its 
adoption of a fundamental error analysis applicable to most unpreserved claims of 
constitutional violations. For most such claims, this Court will only provide relief if the 
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defendant satisfies a three-prong test by establishing that the error "(1) violates one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the 
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28. 
Some unpreserved constitutional errors "structural defects" -- are of such 
magnitude that they defy the application of the harmless error test set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The 
constitutional rights underlying such structural defects "are so basic to a fair trial that the 
violation of those rights requires an automatic reversal and is not subject to harmless 
error analysis." Id. at 222 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991 )). 
Structural defects are those "which affect 'the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself' and thus are so inherently unfair 
that they are not subject to harmless error analysis." Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
at 307-08.) 
In Perry, this Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had only found 
the following errors to be structural: "(1) complete denial of counsel; (2) biased trial 
judge; (3) racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of self-
representation at trial; (5) denial of a public trial; (6) defective reasonable doubt 
instruction; and (7) erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). The Perry Court noted, "[a]lthough there may be other constitutional 
violations that would so affect the core of the trial process that they would require an 
automatic reversal, as a general rule, most constitutional violations will be subject to 
harmless error analysis." Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
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U . 275 (1993), the United States Supreme Court, discussing the right to a jury trial 
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, concluded, "[t]he deprivation of that right, with 
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably 
qualifies as 'structural error."' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281-82. 
2. Waiver Of A Constitutional Right 
"[TJhe state has a heavy burden in overcoming a presumption against the waiver 
of constitutional rights." State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 276 (1985) (citation 
omitted). On appeal, a waiver of a constitutional right "will be upheld if the entire record 
demonstrates the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." V. 
Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95 (2004); see a/so State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498 (1983) 
(appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether trial 
court properly found a valid waiver of a constitutional right). 
C. Mr. Umphenour Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Under 
Both The Idaho And United States Constitutions, When The District Court Held A 
Court Trial In The Absence Of Any Waiver By Mr. Umphenour 
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "[t]he right 
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ... A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal 
cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court .... " IDAHO CONST. Art. 
I § 7. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Idaho 
Constitution provides greater protection of the right to a jury trial in a criminal case than 
the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(Sixth Amendment guarantees jury trial only for "serious, non-petty offense[s]," while 
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Article I, Section 7 guarantees jury trial for "all public offenses which are potentially 
punishable by imprisonment or where potential fines or other sanctions are punitive in 
nature") (citations omitted). 
In concluding that a criminal defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has explained that because the right is so 
important it must be "jealously preserved," and, "that, before any waiver can become 
effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, 
in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (emphasis added). The Court concluded by noting, "the duty of the 
trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound 
and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from" 
the preference for trial by jury, with the court's "caution increasing in degree as the 
offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Id. at 312-13. 
The plain language of the Idaho Constitution provides that a criminal defendant 
may waive his right to a jury trial when such a waiver is "expressed in open court." The 
Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "A waiver of a jury trial will not be implied in 
doubtful cases." Neal v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Ada County, 42 Idaho 624, _, 248 P. 
22, 24 (1926) (citations omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals adopted the American 
Bar Association's recommendation that a "'[c]ourt shall not accept a waiver unless the 
defendant, after being advised by the court of his right to a trial by jury, personally 
waives his right to trial by jury, either in writing or in open court for the record,"' 
concluding, "A requirement that the Court personally address the defendant will not 
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constitute an undue burden on the courts where this very important right is at issue." 
State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963,966 (Ct. App.1985) (citation omitted). 
Mr. Umphenour did not expressly waive his right to a jury trial under Article I, 
section 7, of the Idaho Constitution, either in writing or in open court. The error is of 
constitutional magnitude, is plain on the face of the record, is structural, and is, 
therefore, not subject to harmless error analysis. As such, Mr. Umphenour is entitled to 
have his conviction vacated, with this matter remanded to the district court for a jury 
trial. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial can only be waived with "the express 
intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. As noted supra in 
the discussion of the Idaho Constitution's jury trial guarantee, the record is devoid of 
any expression by Mr. Umphenour of his desire to waive his right to a jury trial. As 
such, Mr. Umphenour is entitled to have his conviction vacated, with this matter 
remanded to the district court for a jury trial. 
11. 
Assuming That Mr. Umphenour's Court Trial On Stipulated Facts Was Actually A Guilty 
Plea,2 The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His Motion To Withdraw 
His Guilty Plea By Concluding That It Lacked Jurisdiction To Rule On It 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides, "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be 
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to 
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of 
2 Mr. Umphenour advances this argument in the unlikely event that this Court concludes 
that his court trial on stipulated facts was, in fact, a guilty plea. If this Court concludes 
that he did enter a guilty plea, then Mr. Umphenour would have an excellent chance of 
successfully withdrawing his "guilty plea" because he was never informed of the 
consequences of his "guilty plea." 
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conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). 
Interpreting this rule, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "[T]he trial court's 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, 
either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." 
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003). 
As its basis for denying Mr. Umphenour's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
district court provided a single sentence of reasoning: "This court does not have the 
jurisdiction to hear these motions." (Order Denying Motions (augmentation).) 
Considering the fact that, at the time it ruled on his Motion to Withdraw Plea 
Mr. Umphenour had filed a timely Notice of Appeal, the district court most certainly had 
jurisdiction to rule on his Motion to Withdraw Plea brought pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 33(c). The district court's failure to appreciate that it had the authority to grant his 
motion under the prevailing legal standards constituted an abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989) (district court abused its discretion when, 
inter alia, it fails to act "within the outer boundaries of [its] discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices") (citation omitted). Because the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Umphenour's Motion to Withdraw 
Plea, the Order Denying Motions must be vacated, with this matter remanded for 
appointment of counsel and a hearing on his motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Umphenour respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a jury trial. In the 
alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's Order 
11 
Denying Motions, remand this matter for the appointment of counsel and a hearing 
on his Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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